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**Test 1 - Take home:**

 The idea of emotivism states that statements that include keywords such as: right or wrong, good or bad, evil or not; is simply an opinion and a way to express emotions toward a certain subject and possibly persuade others to feel the same way; but has no real cognitive meaning. An example to express this could be like saying that all dogs are bad or evil, due to that they were bitten as a child by a dog; this is simply their personal opinion based off of a personal experience that could be used to sway others’ thoughts on dogs, but not actually stating a fact. An argument presented with the notion of emotivism is the “Frege-Geach Argument” that takes multiple parts of the claim into account, such as the moral logic of the sentence, and the meanings and functions of the parts of the sentence; which then are used to further break down the claim into better understanding that ultimately lead to declaring that emotivism is wrong in that if it were true, moral arguments are false, but moral arguments are, in fact, true. According to Mark van Roojen in his article on non-cognitivism, found in the Stanford Encyclopedia, one of the possible responses to this is the Verifiability Argument and non-cognitive relativism. While the Verifiability Principle states that something has cognitive meaning when it can be supported by empirical evidence; the argument states that the principle is true, the moral claim is not analytic nor confirmed or not with evidence, if those are true then there is no cognitive meaning, and emotivism is true; relativism is similarly stated. According to the former, it is allowed in the eyes of non-cognitivists that saying a moral claim that is relevant, but doesn’t necessarily have to be true or false, as it is a moral judgement. Both can somewhat stronger in argument in that they relate to the idea of emotivism. Both assess a statement, whether the parts of the statement can be considered a fact, with the cases of empirical evidence, or if they are simply just moral judgements regarding a subject, and separating what can be considered a emotivist statement and what is not.

Analytic naturalism deals with the idea that moral terms have a naturalistic property, referring to that statements under this belief have a natural and possible property or meaning; then moral terms can be justified as either true or false based upon empirical evidence through observation and inference. One way to explain this is through the example of wealth; individuals simply want wealth because it can offer greater opportunities, ensure the coverage of all basic needs and at least some more luxurious desires and take away their fears of debt. However, individuals may want wealth just for the idea of being wealthy. Another example could be a childhood habit of sucking thumbs for comfort for numerous reasons, especially as it was a natural action for babies to suck; meaning that they maintaining natural reactions and movements. Those who continue with it as toddlers many use it as a comfort technique, knowing that it feels comforting to suck on their thumbs for various reasons, like helping with anxiety. One of the arguments to this notion is the Open Question Argument distinguishes what can be considered “good” or “helpful to the human welfare”, in that the two are not always meaning the same thing, but also depending on whether it is an open (complicated or uncomplicated) statement or not. This suggests that with a given statement, the meaning of it is broken down, and whether if the intention, meaning the “goodness” of the claim, and then the trueness of how “good” the statement is. A response to this argument, which supports it notions, is an idea by William Frankena, as explained in James Lenman’s *Moral Naturalism* in the Stanford Encyclopedia, in that when the “goodness” of a statement is false, then proving the Open Question Argument. On the other hand, Michael Smith, as explained in the same article, suggests that the argument “proves too much” for answering the question, which then deals with a reasoning in the Paradox of Analysis, making the importance “goodness” of a claim lesser in comparison to the analytic truths in relation to the openness of the question or statement. Both these responses analyze and bring into light multiple aspects that deal with Open Question Argument, and whether it is valid or not, such as that perhaps it claims too much, meaning that it isn’t specific enough to differentiate between some claims and rather if the real discussions should be asked about the actual “goodness” of the claim, or about the questions that determine whether the argument is valid or not based on reasonings of other philosophical thoughts.

Citations/Websites and Articles Used:

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/>

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-moral/>

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/